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Introduction
Political scientists have devoted a considerable amount of attention to
devising various measures or classificatory schemes of state interparty competition (ipc).' These endeavors served a useful heuristic purpose and
assisted in characterizing the complexion of state ipc generally, two functions signific ant especially in the developmental stages of the literature on
state parties. 2
Too often, though, these conceptual initiatives lacked focus.
Classificatory systems can be evaluated properly only by reference to the
larger purposes they are to serve. That is, these constructs are not ends in
them selves but rather are research tools designed to assist in the investigation of more pervasive political phenomena. 3 Such a focus materialized in
the state policy literature,• one aspect of which sought to assess the relative
effectiveness of socioeconomic and political factors (e.g., ipc) in explaining
interstate policy variation. This "policy focus" now is a central consideration of research on state politics. It is possible, therefore, to specify two
criteria for the evaluation of various ipc measures: 1) their ability to portray accurately the character of political competition in the states, and;
2) the ease and precision-both
practical and theoretical-of
their incorporation into the current structure of research on state political systems. We
wish here to argue concerning the deficiencies of previous measures of ipc,
and, in addition, present a new measure which overcomes most of these
shortcomings.
Deficiencies of Previous Indices
With the above two critieria in mind, two classes of problems-tec hnical and theoretical-become
apparent in the various ipc indices
extant in the literature.
Dawson and Robinson indicated three major technical problem
areas-time periods considered, offices included, and the ways of looking
at competition within the context of the first two factors. s The time period
selected for the competition index should roughly coincide with the time
period of the policy data. 6 Concentration upon one office is unreliable. '
And if the states are to be treated as policy "systems," then measures which
include non-state races (e.g., U.S. Senators) are unsatisfactory, 8 regardless
of how useful they may be for indicating the general contours of state party
competition. Further, while state legislators are pivotal policy actors, con27

sideration of these offices is often excluded. 9 Finally, several meas ur
resort to either placing the states into various competitive categories 10 or
rank ordering the states according to the degree of ipc. 1 1 But the categ ories
are sometimes rather crude, often not logically distinct, and usually obsc ure
subtle but important distinctions among the states in any given categ ory,
Rank ordering can be misleading if the states happen to fall in clusters, and
it does not permit complex statistical operations as would be the case if the
data were presented in interval form.
A more serious technical problem concerns the manner in which
legislative competition is usually measured. Several of the meas ures
employed in state policy research 12 have focused on three aspects of ipc : one
minus the percentage of the popular vote of the victorious guberna torial
candidate, and one minus the percentage of seats won by the majority party
in each house of the state legislature. Though having the advantages of data
availability and ease of measurement, this approach can distort the actual
situation of party conflict in the states. It is possible, for example, that a
legislature having, say, 100 seats could be divided equally between the two
parties. Yet it is also logically possible that each of these elections was un.
contested by one of the parties. Thus this approach would classify this situa.
tion as one of "perfect" competition, clearly a distortion of actua l com.
petitive conditions. While this admittedly is a rather extreme examp le, it is
usually the case that a substantial proportion of legislative electio ns arc
decided by lopsided margins.
The theoretical prob lem concerns the linkage of these previous ipc constructs. It will be recalled that the impetus for this literature was the "Key
theory," which stated that ipc exerts an interveni ng influence betwee n state
economic conditions and state spending for "redistributive issues ." 13 Candidates in competitive districts will favor a greater level and range of public
services in an attempt to secure the votes of the large middle and lowe r middle class voter blocs. The crucial linkage, then, is between the deg ree of
competition and public policy. Previous ipc measures, by cou ntina
legislative seats already won by the parties, totally ignore the extent of competition in the actual legislative elections. In effect, previous indices arc
measures of "legislative or parliamentary" competition rather than " elec•
tora l " competition. These measures therefore suffer from a theoretica l deficiency since the Key theory posits an electoral rather than a parliame ntarJ
linkage between competition and policy.
A Proposed New Measure

One method of overcoming the problems of measuring legislative com·
petition discussed above would be to calculate the average vote of all can·
dictates of the victorious party in the elections for both houses of the
legislatures. This would in a way be similar to the previous measures but in·
stead wou ld focus on the extent of competition in each legislative district.
While this approach is preferred over previous measures, it still wou ld not
overcome a serious problem common to both approaches. For example , ac·
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ording to a distribution of seats measure of ipc both New York and Illinois
c re highly competitive states.•• However, most races are in fact not highly
aontested, with Democrats controlling Cook County and Republicans con~rolling downstate in Illinois, and Democrats controlling New York City
and Republicans controlling upstate in New York. These conditions could
be identified by an ipc measure which focused on individual legislative
races, but by averaging the vote of all the candidates of the victorious party
these non-competitive conditions within the state would cancel each other
out, once again producing a higly competitive score. In effect such indices
are actually measures of one-party dominance rather than measures of in-

terparty competition.
A new ipc measure is proposed here, one that is theoretically sound in
that it is addressed to competition in each legislative district, and is capable
of identifying the actual patterns of competition in the states. This new
rneasure has three components, the average of which represents a composite
ipc index:
J. one minus the proportion of the popular vote of the victorious
gubernatorial candidate;
2. one minus the average vote of all victorious candidates in elections
for the upper house of the state legislature, and;
3. one minus the average vote of all victorious candidates in elections
for the lower house of the state legislature.
The major shift entailed by this new measure is that attention is focused
on the extent of competition in state legislative races regardless of party.
This approach is preferable for technical reasons because it avoids the kind
of problems posed by the Illinois and New York examples. More important
is the fact that this technique is superior in theoretical terms. The Key
linkage is addressed to the degree of party competition in a state political
system rather than the extent of ohe-party dominance. Perhaps this point
was obscured in subsequent applications of the linkage due to the fact that
Keydescribed politics in the South at a time when one-party dominance and
interparty competition meant essentially the same thing. When applied outside the South in a different historical period, however, this distinction
becomes crucial, both empirically and theoretically. And we argue that only
by focusing on the idea of competition (regardless of party) as described
above can we: a) measure the extent of actual political competition in the
states, and b) construct an ipc index amenable to the framework of contemporary research on comparative state public policy.

APPENDIX
This new ipc measure can be represented algebraically as follows:
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